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South African Propaganda Agencies and the Battle for Public Opinion 
during the Second World War, 1939–1945 




South Africa’s entry into the Second World War in 1939 was complex. The Smuts government lacked 
nation-wide support and experienced hostile reactions from opponents of its war policy. It was also 
subjected to Nazi propaganda offensives, which intensified national divisions and undermined public 
morale. In response, the Union authorities adopted a volunteer policy for military service and 
embarked on a massive drive to secure positive public opinion and national support for the war policy. 
This move led to the establishment of various publicity and propaganda organisations to influence 
public opinion and to stimulate enthusiasm for the war. However, inadequate policy direction and 
lacking a solid framework to guide propaganda organisation and operations created inter-agency 
frictions and rivalries. The study on which this article is based, examined the main propaganda 
agencies, the Bureau of Information (BOI), the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the 
Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS), which contested one another for jurisdiction, authority and power 
to shape public opinion in South Africa during the war. The analysis focused on the rationale for their 
establishment, their purpose, objectives and activities. Then the article reports on the inter-
institutional relationships, organisational politics and competition, and how these aspects affected the 
Union’s propaganda enterprise, mobilisation drive and the prosecution of the war effort. 
Keywords: South Africa, Second World War, Union Defence Force, Bureau of Information, 
Directorate of Military Intelligence, Union Unity Truth Service, publicity and propaganda 
 
1. Introduction 
The twentieth century has been dubbed “a century of propaganda”.1 Although this phenomenon is as 
old as history itself, it was given impetus in the twentieth century by the upsurge of mass 
communication media, namely radio, films and newspapers. As a vital element in conflict, the value 
of propaganda was largely demonstrated during the First World War (1914–1918), the first ‘total war’ 
in modern history. As Jowett and O’Donnell explain, “no longer did single battles decide wars … 
whole nations were pitted against other nations, requiring the cooperation of entire populations, both 
militarily and psychologically”.2 To build relations with the home population, governments exploited 
propaganda to secure positive public opinion and to acquire support for the war policies.3 Harold 
Lasswell, an American social scientist and pioneer of propaganda studies, asserted in 1927 that, “no 
government could hope to win without a united nation behind it and no government could have a 
united nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its people”.4 
Despite being discredited as an “enemy of free thought and speech”, and abandoned by major 
democracies of Great Britain5 and the United States of America (USA),6 the role of propaganda in 
future conflicts was still considered necessary.7 Adolf Hitler, Nazi leader in Germany, had recognised 
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the significance of propaganda as a ‘weapon of war’, and took over where the British and the 
Americans had left off. A special ministry of public enlightenment and propaganda was established in 
March 1933 under Joseph Goebbels, and waged extensive propaganda campaigns to promote the Nazi 
ideology in Germany and abroad.8 When war erupted in September 1939, many countries rushed to 
create institutional apparatus for ‘information services’. The British, after parliamentary agitations, 
established the ministry of information (MOI) in September 1939,9 and the United States, through the 
presidential Executive Order 9182 of 13 June 1942, consolidated several heterogeneous and 
overlapping propaganda agencies to form the office of war information (OWI).10 The Union of South 
Africa (as it was called from 1910–1961) was no exception. At the outbreak of what would become 
the Second World War (1939–1945), the government established the Bureau of Information (BOI) 
and other institutions also emerged, to disseminate propaganda and influence public opinion.  
South Africa was particularly in a difficult position because its entry into the war lacked 
nation-wide consensus. The country experienced internal divisions and hostile reactions from sections 
of the population who objected to intervention in the war. The Union prime minister, General JBM 
Hertzog, was pro-neutrality and his deputy, General JC Smuts, was pro-intervention in support of 
Britain. The Union parliament approved Smuts’s intervention motion, and Hertzog resigned as prime 
minister. At the request of Sir Patrick Duncan, the governor-general of the Union, Smuts formed a 
new government. Hertzog joined the opposition led by Dr DF Malan, an ultra-nationalistic Afrikaner 
and leader of the National Party. In addition, throughout the 1930s, the Union endured Nazi 
propaganda offensives, which encouraged exclusive ethnic-nationalism among Afrikaners and 
promoted the anti-British and anti-Jewish sentiment.11 Moreover, the country witnessed a rise of the 
radical right movements, particularly the pro-Nazi Ossewa-brandwag (OB) (ox wagon sentinels), 
founded in February 1939. Led by Dr JFJ van Rensburg, the OB embarked on militant campaigns in 
the country against the Smuts government.12 On the other hand, the Union’s black society, dissatisfied 
with the racially induced discriminatory policies against them, displayed ambivalence towards the war 
and agitated for political concessions.13 Consequently, Smuts, confronted with a lack of broader 
national support, endeavoured to stimulate public enthusiasm in the Union for the war through an 
organised propaganda drive. 
Scholarly literature on South Africa’s role and experience during the Second World War is 
extensive. Besides the official histories, i.e. regimental, operational or military administrative 
histories,14 various other publications have focused on South Africa’s complex relationship with Great 
Britain,15 while others dealt with the anti-war resistance and organisations,16 the social history, adult 
education as well as the welfare services for white members of the South African military forces.17 
Yet, unlike in many countries such as Britain, the United States, Germany, Russia and Japan, studies 
of war propaganda in South Africa are limited. However, there are few publications worth noting, 
which have endeavoured to provide insight into the subject. 
Fransjohan Pretorius produced an excellent work, examining Boer propaganda on commando 
during the South African War of 1899–1902. It is an important development since most research tends 
to focus on British propaganda in that war.18 With regard to the First World War, some important 
publications have reflected on propaganda as an element in the broader war theme, but did not provide 
an in-depth analysis. These are by authors Bill Nasson19 and Albert Grundlingh.20 In the case of the 
Second World War, Suryakanthie Chetty has examined the Union government’s attempts to foster 
‘national unity’ through visual propaganda, by analysing the pro-war publication, Libertas and the 
two film documentaries, Fall in and With our men in the North.21 However, the focus is slanted 
towards women and some representations of blacks. Nicole Wiederroth also produced an article on 
war propaganda, specifically the introduction of radio broadcasting for blacks to combat the perceived 
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subversive agitations amongst them.22 Research is mainly limited to the objectives of radio services to 
South African blacks and their reactions. As recent and useful works on the theme of war propaganda 
in the Union, these publications offer insights into the ‘products’ of propaganda agencies. Except for 
Wiederroth, limited attention is given to the organisational dynamics, institutional politics, inter-
agency rivalries and competing agendas in an effort to manipulate public opinion in South Africa. 
This article, based chiefly on a study of archival sources, attempts to provide a critical 
perspective on South Africa’s institutional apparatus for war propaganda during the Second World 
War. For reasons of scope, the study primarily examined three major agencies as lenses through 
which to view the Union’s wartime dynamics of the propaganda system and institutional politics 
regarding the shaping of public opinion and the implications for the war effort. These are the BOI, the 
Department of Defence (DOD)’s directorate of military intelligence (DMI) and the Union Unity Truth 
Service (UUTS). The analysis centred on the organisation and purpose of the propaganda agencies, 
inter-institutional relationships and the conception of their roles with regard to the shaping of public 
opinion. The study sought to explore why the Union’s wartime propaganda system was described by 
witnesses as a “chaotic state of affairs", and how this affected the war effort.23 
 
2. From Government Printer to Bureau of Information (BOI) 
Wednesday, 6 September 1939, marked South Africa’s official severing of ties with the German 
Reich and entering the war in support of Britain.24 Internal conflict erupted and the country was 
divided into two major blocs: the pro-neutrality (generally referred to as ‘anti-war’) and the pro-
intervention (generally referred as ‘pro-war’) blocs.25 Furthermore, the black communities also 
displayed mixed reactions, from moderate support to apathy or rejection of the war policy.26 What is 
more, there was inadequate policy direction, no immediate defence plans, limited manpower, and a 
lack of equipment and training facilities.27 The Union Defence Force (UDF) also endured internal 
disaffections as some members objected to the war policy and rejected military service outside South 
Africa.28 To complicate matters, Nazi Germany, in an attempt to limit the war potential of Britain, her 
main European rival, waged extensive propaganda to foster defeatism and to cultivate the neutrality of 
enemy countries, including South Africa.29 
These constraints troubled Smuts with respect to the effective implementation of the war 
policy. To minimise internal tensions and resentment, Smuts adopted a volunteer policy for military 
service. This effectively necessitated a massive drive to encourage recruitment to fill the ranks of the 
UDF. Publicity and propaganda became areas of immediate government activity. However, the 
government had neither a policy nor a centrally organised publicity and propaganda system to 
facilitate the mass mobilisation of public support for the war effort.30 Pre-war publicity for the 
government, both statutory and commercial, was handled by the Government Printer, Lieutenant 
Colonel JJ Kruger, as the director of government printing and stationery services.31 Other state 
departments such as the departments of railways and harbours, education and the post office, had their 
small publicity units. When hostilities broke out, the government made money available and various 
state departments “became publicity conscious”, resulting in chaotic overlaps and duplication.32 Due 
to the requirements for military service, the Government Printer was faced with staff shortage while 
there was an increase in the accounts for state recruiting schemes; therefore, publicity was outsourced 
to private advertising agencies.33 Still, the government was confronted with the question of an 
“efficient dissemination of a multitude of ideas to the mass of the people, in an effort to secure 
maximum positive results in the various spheres of war activity”.34 
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On 18 September 1939, Smuts met his interior minister responsible for internal security and 
propaganda, HG Lawrence, and outlined his objectives. The priority was to counter the Nazi 
propaganda conducted through the German-based Zeesen radio.35 Broadcasting in different languages, 
including Afrikaans to South Africa, Zeesen radio was exploited by the Nazis since 1933 to conduct 
propaganda to promote their cause across the world.36 Anxious about its effect on the intensification 
of the opposition against him, Smuts bemoaned the Zeesen propaganda offensives and the agitation of 
the public.37 He suggested ‘jamming’ the broadcast, but Lawrence felt that such action would risk 
eliminating the wireless if Germany retaliated. Instead, it was suggested to arrange with the Union’s 
public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), to allocate at least 30 
minutes for the government broadcast to counter the Zeesen.38 Already, on 18 September 1939, the 
SABC board had resolved to support the government’s war policy.39 The broadcasts were to focus on 
the government’s policy and war position and not on party politics.40 Smuts also wanted the 
establishment of a publicity committee with “at least one first-class journalist” on it.41 
That journalist was Arthur N Wilson of the Argus Printing and Publishing Company. He 
became the government information officer in the ‘Office of the Prime Minister’, to give the public 
“the right information and guidance”.42 The post of information officer had existed in the public 
service department since January 1936 but was never utilised.43 In September 1937, the then prime 
minister, Hertzog, decided to institute a press intelligence office to provide the ‘correct information’ 
about government activities to the press, “as the press was most important in the formation of public 
opinion”.44 In October 1937, the designation changed to that of information officer.45 With the change 
of government in September 1939, Smuts appointed Wilson to head the official institution called the 
Bureau of Information (BOI), with the initial mandate of combating Zeesen propaganda.46 In August 
1940, the BOI was moved to the interior department under HG Lawrence. Wilson was required to 
provide the war-related news, confidential information to form the background to leading articles and 
to put out broadcasts every evening at 19:15. He was also required to liaise with the British Ministry 
of Information (MOI) to determine what kind of information was required about South Africa in 
relation to the war.47 
The BOI was established ab initio. From its inception, Wilson and his ten-member staff 
operated ‘haphazardly’ without any “set policy or driving purpose”.48 In November 1939, the BOI 
defined its objectives and scope in a memorandum submitted to the cabinet sub-committee on 
publicity: 
 The collection and organisation of information related to government policy and activities for 
purposes of publication; 
 The examination of Zeesen broadcasts and the preparation of statements relating thereto for 
transmission over the radio and to the press; 
 The preparation of statements of a more direct propaganda value for radio transmission and 
publication to the press; 
 The liaison with London, arrangement and supply of publicity photographs, weekly press 
cuttings and news summaries to the British Press Relations Officer. Also, to maintain contact 
and exchange information with the British High Commissioner in South Africa; and 
 The maintenance of friendly contacts with the press and distribution of news to newspaper 
correspondents, and also to maintain a close watch on the South African press for all 
comments and news of interest to the Union government.49 
The BOI, henceforth, superseded the Government Printer as the primary state institution for 
coordinating publicity and propaganda, linking the government, including the DOD, to the public.50 
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The Government Printer would then focus on the UDF’s printing and stationery services.51 The BOI 
was required to disseminate propaganda through the newspapers, radio and films to assist the 
government in popularising its war policy.52 For the Union authorities, the main priority was the white 
Afrikaans-speaking audience in the country. There were fears of the destabilisation effect of Nazi 
propaganda, which was fostering extremist Afrikaner nationalism, cultivating a pro-Nazi bias and 
preaching the ‘neutrality concept’, which was obstructive to recruitment and mobilisation.53 Thus, the 
BOI’s main propaganda effort was defined: 
To try and convert the [white] Afrikaans-speaking section of the population from their present 
pro-Nazi attitude of the mind, to a belief in the justice of the Allied cause, and to a subsequent 
or consequent belief in the correctness of South Africa’s policy of entering the war.54 
Wilson’s strategy was to discredit Zeesen by analysing the transcripts from the SABC, then to 
expose its inaccuracies and factual distortions, and provide ‘authentic’ information.55 As war 
developed, the activities of the BOI expanded, taking over the ‘publicity’ role for other state 
departments and facilitating the production of propaganda films.56 Unlike the British MOI or the 
American OWI, the Union’s BOI was not located at the highest echelons of state power, i.e. at 
ministerial level.57 Politically and administratively, the BOI was controlled from the interior 
minister’s office.  
Without any official state policy, Wilson operated on an ad hoc basis – using his own “super-
initiative and creative impulse”, which became “embarrassing to the Civil Service and Treasury”.58 
This produced criticisms and clashes over authority, responsibility and jurisdiction, making it 
imperative for the authorities to review and reorganise the complete state publicity and propaganda 
machinery. Therefore, the government introduced the publicity and propaganda advisory committee 
with the object of assisting and advising the BOI, and with the view to securing better propaganda 
coordination to “attain definite objectives”.59 
 
3. BOI vs DOD: Inter-agency clashes and reorganisation of state publicity and propaganda 
Regarded by the state as an “essential war department … and the staff doing important war work”,60 
the BOI was subjected to severe criticisms for various reasons. Wilson’s counter-statements against 
Zeesen were criticised as unnecessary “childish backchat”.61 Moreover, the BOI was criticised by the 
public and the opposition press62 for having staff members, including Wilson, who were not fluent in 
Afrikaans, thus “failing to understand the psychology of the Afrikaans-speaking people”.63 The 
appointment of two fully bilingual and well-known journalists, M Uys Krige and SJ Marais Steyn, to 
the BOI in 1940, was aimed at solving the language deficiency.64 The DOD was particularly very 
critical of the BOI’s general conduct and coordination of state publicity and propaganda.65 Military 
officers accused the BOI of monopolising all the news, insufficient coverage of military activities, the 
lack of quality reporting and administrative inefficiency in relation to disseminating propaganda 
material to the wider public across the Union.66 The stage was set for a long turf war between the BOI 
and the DOD over authority and control of publicity and propaganda towards the public. The DOD 
regarded itself as the most qualified state institution for that purpose, and wanted direct control of the 
propaganda machinery to facilitate the shaping of public opinion.67 
In November 1939, the DOD appointed a chief press liaison officer, Captain WA Bellwood, 
on the staff of the secretary for defence, Brigadier General CH Blaine.68 The main objective of the 
chief press liaison officer was to facilitate the effective coordination of the DOD’s recruiting and 
publicity efforts in a ‘centralised’ manner via the deputy adjutant general and director of recruiting, 
Colonel GCG Werdmuller. Bellwood then recommended a publicity scheme, which involved 
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broadcasting and producing material for films about servicemen, issuing booklets and brochures, 
developing posters for recruitment and also informing the public about the defence activities through 
the press.69 This scheme, which clearly reflected similar tasks performed by the BOI, was surprisingly 
approved by the Union’s chief of the general staff (CGS), Major General (later Lieutenant General) 
Sir Pierre van Ryneveld, and confirmed via a circular instruction in May 1940: 
The Chief Press Liaison Officer [Bellwood] … is the direct representative of the Director 
General of Operations in regard to all matters concerning the Press and other publicity. No 
statement for the Press or for any other channel of publicity shall be issued by any Section or by 
any Command unless it has been approved by the Director General of Operations or his 
representative above-mentioned. All arrangements in regard to broadcasting and films, shall be 
made through the Director General of Operations or his representative above-mentioned, and no 
independent arrangement may be made.70 
Bellwood’s appointment represented a parallel structure competing with the BOI as conduit for 
propaganda dissemination. Thus, two state institutions were on a collision course. In August 1940, 
despite Van Ryneveld’s approval of the military’s publicity scheme, Wilson issued a request to the 
DOD to have a military officer “with considerable journalistic experience and news sense”, 
representing the BOI in the office of the CGS – the highest military office – for “access to all 
documents relating to training, operations and manoeuvres” pertaining to the UDF, and to have 
“absolute right to interview regularly” heads of all sections of the DOD.71 This request by Wilson, 
aimed at propagating the UDF to the public, was also a way of asserting authority. He regarded the 
BOI as a “propagandist for the Defence Department and the purveyor of information generally”.72 
Wilson’s conception of his role contrasted with how the DOD authorities perceived themselves and 
their role in terms of publicity and propaganda. 
The heads of sections in the UDF rejected Wilson’s request. Brigadier General J Mitchell-
Baker, the quartermaster general, argued that the DOD officers and heads of sections were 
“overworked and harried” for them to be subjected to regular interviews.73 Colonel HT Newman, 
deputy director of military intelligence (DDMI), also refused. He contended, “it cuts right across the 
intelligence organisation” of the DOD, which incidentally, already had Major DAW Ruck, a capable 
officer heading the military publicity section called DMI (Ic), who did not “require journalistic flair”, 
but could efficiently perform the functions “concerned with publicity, propaganda and censorship”.74 
The BOI officials were also accused of having “little military experience or knowledge, and not 
knowing what they wanted”.75 It was further argued that the UDF’s director general of operations 
(DGO), Brigadier P de Waal, was responsible for what was released to the press, “not a civilian over 
whom the Defence Department exercises no control”.76  
Matters came to head in October 1940, during a meeting held by the interior minister, CGS, 
BOI, the director of military intelligence (DMI) and the director general training and operations (DGT 
& O). It was reported that things were not going right in the BOI and that the UDF troops were 
“getting no useful publicity”. The problem was attributed to poor relations between the DMI, the BOI 
and the press via the South African Press Association (SAPA). Van Ryneveld threatened to “get rid of 
individuals causing problems or altering the existing organisation”.77 In that meeting, other DOD 
officers explicitly stated they wanted to “conduct [their] own publicity and propaganda” and they 
possessed the required expertise to “run [their] own show”.78 However, in an apparent volte-face, Van 
Ryneveld reminded the delegates that the medium for the dissemination of news was the BOI. It was 
unclear whether he referred to propaganda or ‘hard news’. Nobody in that meeting asked for clarity. 
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To reduce the constant squabbles, the interior minister requested Wilson to provide a report 
explaining the purpose and responsibilities of the BOI in order to justify its existence and 
expenditures.79 The report outlined various activities:  
 Dissemination of news and publicity on the activities of the DOD;  
 Compiling daily press reports for circulation within government to create awareness about the 
public’s criticisms, grievances and political tendencies;  
 Handling official press statements from senior government or military officials;  
 Coordinating radio broadcasts;  
 Facilitating the production and dissemination of propaganda films;  
 Serving as the publicity agency for the DOD’s director of recruiting (Werdmuller);  
 Mediating between the press and military censorship on relevant matters; and  
 Coordinating publicity with other state departments.80  
With regard to the press liaison section of the DOD (Bellwood’s section), it was unclear where it was 
located; however, it was somehow required to operate via the BOI for the dissemination of 
propaganda about the UDF to the public.81 As Van Ryneveld pointed out, the whole system was 
failing and it produced confusion and duplication. This needed to be altered. 
Thus, in December 1940, Lawrence established a six-member national advisory committee on 
government publicity headed by the pressmen, Sisson Cooper, general manager of the Cape Argus 
Group, and EB Dawson, then editor of the Sunday Express, as the vice-chairman.82 The DOD officers, 
Brigadier General HJ Lenton (controller of censorship) and Colonel Newman (DDMI) also sat on that 
committee, which was allocated £47 000 for a propaganda campaign for a period of six months.83 As 
an advisory organisation, the committee was required to make recommendations regarding 
government’s publicity and mobilisation effort.84 In addition, it could co-opt representatives from the 
DOD’s recruiting and intelligence sections, the controller of manpower and the director general of 
war supplies (DGS) for the purposes of directing the Union-wide publicity and propaganda drive for 
the mobilisation of manpower for military service.85 It was the first major effort at reorganising the 
state publicity and propaganda machinery to reduce tensions and to improve coordination. 
In December 1940, the advisory committee recommended that Wilson discontinue the 
broadcast of his lengthy speeches.86 Instead, government officials would give talks on their 
departmental activities, and prominent loyalists in the Union, who were experts in their fields, were 
invited to talk on the theme, “Why we are in the war”, whose aim was to elaborate on South Africa’s 
rationale for participating in the war.87 The broadcast schedule with the SABC was changed to 19:45, 
to elaborate on issues just after the news. These changes came into effect on 6 January 1941.88 
Furthermore, the staff of the BOI was expanded and roles were redefined. Piet Beukes and Uys Krige 
dedicated their efforts to the Afrikaans programmes and Captain Nigel Sutherland, a radio liaison, 
was attached to the DGS.89 These changes brought limited improvements, as the BOI and the DMI 
(Ic) seemed to have cooperated better for a few months. Still, the lack of a broad propaganda policy 
remained a problem.  
In August 1941, the DMI (Ic) highlighted the need for “a clear lead in POLICY … or general 
propaganda framework”, because at that time, there were instances of “confused propaganda arising 
out of the absence of policy”.90 For example, the government adopted a ‘soft approach’ on military 
recruitment to protect domestic labour needs, whilst the DMI (Ic) (via the BOI) had intensified 
propaganda for military engineers or motor transport.91 Such contradictions exposed the weaknesses 
of the advisory committee, which was supposed to have created institutional harmony in the whole 
propaganda machinery. The main reason for its weakness was that it was an ad hoc body with limited 
power – purely advisory in nature and purpose.92 
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By mid-1942, the advisory committee was replaced by a military-dominated structure called 
the defence recruiting and publicity committee, headed by Colonel Werdmuller (director of recruiting) 
and Dr EG Malherbe (DMI) as the vice-chairman. It had representations from other state departments 
and the BOI (Wilson). This committee, operating under the secretary for defence (Blaine), had 
advisory and executive powers; however, due to the perennial manpower problem, its scope was 
limited to recruiting schemes.93 The BOI remained the chief state propaganda agency and the 
Government Printer was accountable for financial expenditures.94 Within the military circles, 
dissatisfactions regarding the BOI’s monopoly of war-related publicity and propaganda towards the 
public continued to persist. 
 
4. The AES,95 SAPR96 and BOI: Intensification of rivalries and the effect on the 
propaganda effort 
Whilst the BOI focused on stimulating the public for war support, the defence authorities were 
confronted with disconcerting reports about troop apathy and disloyal tendencies within the UDF.97 
Those reports, reflecting the political dissensions and growing manifestations of the Nazi-inspired 
political extremism in the country, produced fears within the military establishment.98 The major 
concerns were the political and military implications for the troops’ loyalty and morale.99 
Consequently, ‘constructive propaganda’ within the UDF became imperative. The responsibility fell 
on the DMI to deal with security, intelligence, local censorship and propaganda.100 Major Ruck, who 
became the officer commanding (OC) of the propaganda sub-section of military intelligence, DMI 
(Ic), had suggested various propaganda initiatives for troops, including lecture services and talks, 
newspapers, recreation and entertainment services to improve their morale.101 Those suggestions were 
not considered due to concerns about military discipline,102 that is, until reports of apathy and 
disloyalty within the forces alarmed military authorities about the negative effect on troop cohesion. 
An opportunity was thus presented for the DMI (Ic) to demonstrate its capacity to conduct military 
propaganda – within the UDF.103 
While the military authorities were contemplating the introduction of propaganda within the 
UDF, the interior minister believed that propaganda activities were the concern of the BOI and not the 
function of the military.104 It was only after the submission of a proposal for an educational scheme 
for the troops by an unofficial committee led by Alfred Hoernlé, an influential professor of 
philosophy at the University of the Witwatersrand and liberal supporter of Smuts, that action was 
taken.105 The Hoernlé scheme was supplemented by another proposal by Captain (later Major) Leo 
Marquard, an instructor at the South African Military College, who was supported by Major (Dr) EG 
Malherbe (later DMI). The Malherbe–Marquard scheme proposed the training of military officers for 
political education of the troops. It differed from the Hoernlé scheme due to its focus on military 
officers, not civilians, to conduct such educational services.106 
The fundamental feature of the two schemes was to develop the consciousness of the UDF 
troops regarding the reasons for participation in the war, to realise not only what they were fighting 
against, but also the cause they were fighting for – to preserve the country’s political, cultural and 
economic assets.107 With the support of Smuts and Van Ryneveld, an army education services (AES) 
headed by Dr Malherbe as chief education officer, was instituted in February 1941. The AES was 
managed through the DMI (officially classified as Im – with m for morale).108 The Hoernlé scheme 
was instituted in the active citizen force (ACF) by a panel of civilian lecturers.109 It was a major 
institutional response by the Union government and military authorities to wrestle with the question of 
disaffections and morale within the UDF. It was essentially what the officers in the DMI (Ic) have 
153 
 
been advocating for.110 The question of the role of the AES and its operational scope requires further 
clarification. 
The AES served to cultivate troop consciousness about the Union’s assets for preservation, to 
strengthen their morale and to “improve the fighting force against Nazism”.111 The intended goals 
were “to equip soldiers to defend democracy and to equip citizen-soldiers to build a better democracy 
once the threat of Fascism has been removed”.112 The four-week AES instructional course, which 
began in March 1941, with 38 carefully selected UDF members, took place at the South African 
Military College, Voortrekkerhoogte (formerly Roberts Heights), in Pretoria.113 Presented by various 
experts in their fields, the AES curriculum included topics such as the cultural–political and internal 
military relations among troops, economic production and income distribution, comparative political 
and economic systems, social interactions and race relations, psychological features of propaganda, 
historical and ideological aspects of the war.114 After completion of the course, the graduates, then 
called information officers (IOs), were distributed among the UDF units to commence with their 
‘political education’ work. The DMI (Ic), in terms of propaganda within the UDF, could then exhibit 
its creativity in support of the AES programme. Headed by Captain RN Lindsay and Lieutenant J 
Malherbe (Dr EG Malherbe’s wife), the main tasks of the DMI (Ic) included the handling of 
censorship among troops, publicity of military activities and public relations (for the UDF) in the 
Union and in the field.115 Although the focus of the DMI (Ic) was supposed to be within the UDF 
(except for censorship), evidently, its ‘public relations’ activities competed with those of the BOI. 
The official state agency for propaganda towards the public was the BOI, liaising with the 
DMI (Ic) for military security and censorship issues.116 However, unofficially, the DMI (Ic) conducted 
‘public relations’ by directly contacting newspapers for publication of military-related material – 
which the press were eager to do.117 Circumventing the official government propaganda institution 
was an affront on the authority of the BOI. The DMI (Ic) indicted the BOI on its ineffectiveness, for 
example, delays in informing the press timeously regarding military manoeuvres, using articles 
produced by the DMI (Ic) for broadcasts instead of handing them to the newspapers, disregarding 
newspaper edition deadlines by late submission of material and generally, despite various overtures 
from the Ic, the director (Wilson) being uncooperative.118 
In addition, when the AES was instituted, it immediately collaborated with the UDF’s Film 
Unit, led by Major HC Weaver, for training the IOs in the use of projectors, and for production and 
circulation of instructional and propaganda films.119 Wilson did not approve of such a film unit and 
protested that it “would encroach on his preserves”.120 In this case, he was referring to the film trade 
in which the BOI had contracted the well-known African Films (later Metro-Goldwin-Mayer [MGM] 
and Twentieth Century Fox – which were all foreign companies) for processing and distribution of 
propaganda films. A South African company, Union Films Ltd, was not considered for film 
production and, upon follow-up inquiries, Wilson indicated that it was an unknown entity. Ironically, 
Union Films was the only company to have sent their own cameraman to East Africa to produce UDF 
newsreels which, incidentally, were used by African Mirror (an African Films branch), supplied via 
the BOI.121 This provided more grounds for criticism by the DMI (Ic) of the BOI for having 
unwarranted monopoly to the detriment of qualitative and expeditious propaganda efforts. The AES 
did not cooperate with the BOI because, ironically, the troops “were apt to discount the Bureau as a 
propaganda machine and, therefore, distrust it”.122 Yet, they relied on the AES. 
In his reaction to criticism, Wilson produced reports about the activities of the BOI for Smuts 
and Lawrence, and later forwarded copies to the DMI for their own analysis. He emphasised the 
reasons for the existence of the BOI, and listed various activities ranging from news services for local 
and foreign papers, broadcasting and film work to DOD support and miscellaneous services.123 He 
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previously also asked for support to reorganise and expand his limited staff (of 45 by 1941), which 
was “overworked” due to the “multiplication of duties in several cases impairing efficiency”.124 
Apparently, the BOI was overstretched due to the high demand for propaganda, especially with the 
escalation of the anti-government militancy and subversive activities in the country.125 As such, 
Wilson lamented ‘unwarranted’ criticisms against his institution and requested protection from 
government because, with a limited staff, he was “doing all that could be done in the sphere of 
propaganda and publicity”.126 To promote the UDF’s war effort further and to ensure wider publicity 
in the Union and abroad, the BOI had requested the DOD to assist in providing facilities for its war 
correspondents in the field. This resulted in yet another organisation being established for that 
purpose, the South African Public Relations (SAPR) unit, operating in Egypt from October 1941.127 
The SAPR was intended to arrange facilities such as camp, transport, censorship and 
transmission facilities for the war correspondents to obtain news, photographs and films “before and 
during active operations” for publicity purposes.128 For control purposes, the unit fell under the 
command of the general officer administration (GOA), UDF Middle East Force, Major General FH 
Theron. The SAPR’s officer commanding, initially referred to as the chief press liaison officer and 
later called assistant director public relations (ADPR), was Lieutenant Colonel EP Hartshorn, who 
was then succeeded by Major RN Lindsay in 1944. The SAPR also had its own Radio Observer unit 
and the Film and Photographic unit.129 It soon ran into problems with the BOI. Its officers, taking 
advantage of their access to battlefield information, argued that they were better equipped and 
competent enough to carry out propaganda activities. The BOI was an unnecessary and redundant 
organisation.130 Conflict between the BOI and SAPR then ensued. 
In April 1944, Lieutenant Colonel DH Ollemans, a UDF chief press officer, produced a report 
regarding the SAPR set-up in the North. In his report, the BOI was dismissed as a “non-military 
organisation” incapable of providing the necessary military background information required for 
publicity.131 Theron had made a similar observation the previous year, and requested that the military 
undertake its own propaganda activities or exercise closer control over the BOI.132 Wilson objected to 
such requests and reminded the critics that it was his prerogative to “supervise, control and coordinate 
the conduct of propaganda in the Union and outside”.133 The BOI was also providing service to the 
troops by editing and managing the military newspapers, EAForce News and Springbok, thus helping 
the AES.134 Wilson further rejected the suggestion by the newspaper editors for a press officer to be 
appointed in the office of Van Ryneveld to obtain direct military information. He contended that a 
press officer in Defence Headquarters (DHQ), working independently of the BOI, would be regarded 
as a public snub.135 
In one form or another, three state organisations, the AES (DMI, Ic), SAPR and the BOI, 
performed ‘independent’ propaganda functions in an effort to influence public opinion. Their 
intermittent conflict over the monopoly of propaganda operations led to overlaps, inefficiency, delays 
and sporadic delivery of ‘information services’ to the public. This resulted in low civilian and military 
morale, low recruitment figures and national complacency.136 At the end of 1943, the Government 
Printer and his officers concluded that propaganda efforts were failing due to the “disorganised nature 
of [the] State publicity machine”.137 “Evidence of failure,” they pointed out, “can be observed in the 
current disconcerting apathy which permeates the people as a whole”.138 However, there were other 
factors such as war-weariness, socio-economic factors and the absence of any direct military threat 
due to the remoteness of the country from the war zone.139 However, emphasis was on the lack of 
centralised coordination in the propaganda system and organisational deficiencies to an extent that 
state departments would work at cross-purposes, e.g. recruiting whilst demobilising. The Government 
Printer emphasised the need for a central coordinating structure with executive powers to “create 
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order out of the existing chaos … where nearly every government department or section [was] 
endeavouring to conduct its own publicity and propaganda”.140 
It was also difficult for the government authorities to manage the inter-institutional rivalries 
politically. Each of those organisations had justifiable reasons for its existence. The DMI/AES 
preserved military morale, with a broad vision of a liberal post-war social order; the BOI sustained 
civilian morale, while also assisting with military recruitment. They all enjoyed the support of Smuts 
and Van Ryneveld. The problem was their indifferent relations and persistent clashes. However, the 
interior minister, Lawrence, often prevailed politically in support of Wilson because he “rendered 
good services to the State in most difficult times”.141 Therefore, the BOI retained a prominent position 
as the main state propagandist. 
 
5. The Union Unity Truth Service: Non-state propaganda movement 
Propaganda in South Africa was not limited to state institutions. Loyal members of the Smuts 
government, concerned about the rise of opposition to the Union’s war policy and the development of 
the Nazi-inspired political extremism, reacted by establishing the Union Unity Truth Service (UUTS). 
This movement, created in September 1939, was inspired by Sir James Rose Innes, Brigadier General 
HNW Botha, Colonel Sir W Dalrymple and Sir Charles Smith. These prominent supporters of Smuts 
publicly appealed for “a large fighting publicity fund to finance a nation-wide campaign to support 
Government … to deal with propaganda from abroad and misrepresentations at home … to promote 
mutual understanding between all sections of people”.142 Therefore, the UUTS was created to carry 
out the objectives of the Union Unity Fund.143 The goal of the movement was to provide intellectual, 
moral and political support for Smuts and the national government in the prosecution of the war.144 
The South African public was implored to contribute financially and pledge their support for the 
objectives of the UUTS – “to help in the effort of counter-propaganda”.145 
The UUTS operated from Johannesburg, and presented itself as ‘the new Crusade’, with 
Smuts as its commander-in-chief. Upon its establishment, Thomas C Robertson, a journalist working 
as a parliamentary correspondent for the Rand Daily Mail, became its director.146 The UUTS also had 
its own propaganda advisory committee under the chairmanship of Senator G Hartog (a member of 
parliament). To pursue its objectives, the movement adopted Afrikaans and English as the language 
policy,147 and advocated a militant propaganda carried out by an organisation independent of 
government.148 
The UUTS, in apparent contrast with the BOI, resolved to operate independently to conduct 
“aggressive and partisan propaganda” which would not commit government.149 Nevertheless, the 
relations between the BOI and the UUTS soon became strained. The UUTS was not a state institution. 
Its propaganda – or what was proffered as counter-propaganda activities – was funded by 
contributions from private citizens and the proceeds from sales of Smuts’s speeches, booklets and 
badges.150 It was linked to government through the advisory committee chaired by the ruling United 
Party (UP) member of parliament (MP) (Senator Hartog).151 The UUTS’s field unit, called the Truth 
Legion, consisted of loyalists who supported the Smuts government and were recruited as active 
canvassers and propagandists for the movement.152 This ‘independent’ movement organised various 
pro-war propaganda schemes, such as the production of Afrikaans-language films, for example 
Noordwaarts (Northwards), the publication of an illustrated magazine called Libertas, and also 
organised publicity campaigns such as ‘Peace through victory’, to counter the anti-intervention 
elements advocating peace with Germany.153 In addition, the UUTS operated a clandestine radio 
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broadcast called ‘Mystery Radio Freedom’, which criticised the opponents of the Union’s war policy 
and attacked the Zeesen broadcasts.154 
Apparently, Wilson perceived the activities of the UUTS as intruding on his domain, and he 
adopted a competitive attitude. For example, Robertson (UUTS director) threatened inter-agency 
‘war’ when Wilson’s film advisory committee recommended the distribution of an Afrikaans 
newsreel produced by UUTS cameraman, Leon Schauder, ‘free of charge’, to a mobile advertising 
agency, Parker’s Talkie Tours, to show to the Afrikaner nationalist communities of the countryside. 
“Serious competition had now arisen,” protested Robertson, because the UUTS also relied on the 
revenue generated from their Afrikaans film tours to the Afrikaans audience.155 Again, after Japan’s 
entry into the war against the Allies, the UUTS suggested anti-Japanese propaganda;156 however, 
Wilson rejected it. He reasoned that the ‘whole’ of UUTS’s effort is counter-propaganda against the 
“Nazi menace” (only against Germany), and therefore it must not deviate from that mission.157 
After the creation of the UUTS, the short-lived national advisory committee on government 
propaganda resolved in October 1940 that the BOI and the UUTS be naturally divided and that they 
should perform independent functions, with the former working for the state.158 Due to the absence of 
a central legal structure with executive powers or a broad policy framework for systematic 
coordination of propaganda activities, rivalries, overlaps and clashes ensued.159 Instead, collaboration 
was more favourable between the DMI (Ic) and the UUTS.160 Ostensibly irritated by the lack of 
cooperation from Wilson, the DMI (Ic) ventured to suggest that the BOI should be absorbed by the 
UUTS as it was an unaffordable “extravagance” to have both in the country.161 
The relationship between the DMI (Ic) and the UUTS was strengthened further through joint 
educational collaboration. In December 1940, the UUTS established a School of Propaganda and 
Political Education, operating from the Kero Hotel, Johannesburg.162 This School delivered a ten-day 
propaganda course to a specially selected group of young South Africans from mainly white 
universities, through a series of lectures by expert individuals, government officials and academics. 
The lecturers included Advocate G Saron (Nazism and the Fifth Column), Professor Leo Fouché 
(propaganda history), Dr Malherbe (film propaganda), and others such as Professor Hoernlé, 
Professor T Haarhoff, Professor ID MacCrone and Dr S Biesheuvel, who formed part of the military’s 
education programme, the AES.163 The UUTS also brought in the head of the Bantu Press, BFG 
Paver, whose company was tasked to produce propaganda newspapers for blacks.164 In some 
instances, the UUTS liaised with OWI (United States) and MOI (Britain) for supplying propaganda 
material from those countries for distribution in South Africa. The activities of the Truth Legion were 
also extended to other parts of Africa to generate “sympathisers” to the Allied cause, particularly in 
Portuguese East Africa.165 
The existence of the UUTS clearly challenged the position of the BOI. Most of its activities 
overlapped with those of the BOI, with sporadic collaboration.166 It was even remarked, during the 
course of the war, that the UUTS appeared to be undertaking tasks which were rightly within the 
scope of the BOI.167 There was a concerted effort by the UUTS to be inclusive and to cooperate with 
other organisations to eliminate inter-agency frictions. However, it was a non-state organ and its 
limitation was that it essentially supported the ruling UP. Its members also campaigned for the 
government during the 1943 elections.168 Such a position also drew public criticism and mistrust.169 
The interior minister was once again at pains to deal with the inter-agency quarrels involving 
the UUTS. An informal and unofficial four-member structure called the coordinating committee 
(representing the BOI, the DMI, the UUTS and the UP), chaired by Dr Malherbe, was attempted in 
1942, to facilitate smooth co-operation between the different propaganda agencies.170 However, it had 
no legal standing or powers to enforce decisions. It mainly offered suggestions and recommendations 
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as a “coordinating body of government publicity”.171 Despite the existence of such a structure, where 
the meeting of interests and mutual understanding could be facilitated between the main propaganda 
organisations, a cooperative spirit remained elusive. During 1944–1945, there was mounting criticism 
levelled against the BOI as a “weak link”172 and a gatekeeper173 and it was even accused of 
“inefficiency or deliberate devilry” for allowing unedited items for publication by the newspapers.174 
However, the controlling influence of Wilson and the reluctance of Smuts and Lawrence to oppose 
him ensured that the BOI retained its eminent position as the main institution for state propaganda. 
Many of its detractors, though, wished that the BOI “should disappear”.175  
 
6. Concluding perspectives 
When war broke out in September 1939, government and public opinion was divided. Undercurrents 
of apathy, hostile reactions and limited enthusiasm, which emanated from the prevailing political, 
social, cultural and racial tensions and differences in society, alarmed Union authorities about the 
effect of the potential fissures on the effective implementation of the war policy. This necessitated the 
creation on an information agency responsible for the interpretation of government’s policy and war 
position to the public, in order to secure national support and to sustain morale. The BOI was then 
established as an official agency to engage in the government’s publicity and propaganda efforts 
during the war. Apart from the initial mandate to combat Nazi propaganda directed at South Africa, 
the brief and scope of the BOI were not defined. There was no well-thought-out government strategy, 
policy or broad frame of reference on which to base the activities of the BOI. 
This lack of clarity created problems with regard to the objectives, operational scope and 
limits of the BOI. Wilson, who then defined the scope, believed that the BOI was the sole agency to 
preserve public morale and the main conduit for the dissemination of government propaganda in all 
matters pertaining to the war. To him, all other organisations existed to provide support for the BOI. 
This view was incompatible with other propaganda institutions. The Government Printer and the DMI 
were concerned about the subordination of the national propaganda operations to a single agency. The 
UUTS, a pro-war but non-state propaganda organisation, also encountered problems with the BOI. 
The most persistent problem related to the monopolisation of propaganda by one institution, the BOI, 
which also attempted to determine the priorities and objectives of other organs – the DMI for UDF 
morale, and the UUTS for countering the Nazi menace. These agencies contended that the BOI did 
not have sufficient capacity in terms of manpower, resources and technical capabilities for such a 
huge national undertaking. This resulted increasingly in competitive behaviours of the different 
propaganda institutions and produced overlaps, duplication, confusion and rivalries, which then 
affected the effectiveness of the whole propaganda system. 
It is harder to establish whether the conflicting relations between the different propaganda 
agencies had any significant negative effect on the war effort. However, it could be inferred from the 
reports that, as the war progressed and the demands of the war increased, the task of government 
became harder, particularly with regard to maintaining sufficient troop levels and sustaining morale. 
The office of the Government Printer explained that the weaknesses in the existing propaganda 
practices were the “spasmodic schemes”: 
Between each scheme there is a lull, frequently of several months, during which no attempt is 
made to sustain public interest. The public mind consequently goes to sleep, and each new 




Although this report appeared in 1943, other reports generated within government structures reiterated 
similar deficiencies and failures.177 The dissemination of propaganda to the broader public was 
generally weak. The recruiting director, Werdmuller, bluntly dismissed propaganda efforts through 
radio broadcast as “close to zero”.178 The resultant widespread apathy, national complacency, low 
recruitment numbers and deterioration of national morale were reflections of propaganda failure. The 
problem was attributed to the lack of policy framework and the absence of a central coordinating body 
with legal powers to direct policy and action; hence, a chaotic state of affairs. This affected 
government’s ability to articulate a precise vision around which the Union population, with divergent 
interests and aspirations, could unite as a national body. However, it would be simplistic to attribute 
propaganda failure to inter-agency rivalries or a lack of policy thereof. Other factors were at play. 
After almost five years of war, people’s priorities had shifted. Most people were 
contemplating the post-war social and economic conditions. As one officer noted, people were 
“concerned about the satisfactory economic basis for living”. The prevailing apathy was caused by the 
fact that “no man [was] certain whether he should defend his country or himself”.179 Propaganda 
efforts could also not overcome the existing divisive barriers such as racial policies, political loyalties 
and contradictory nationalistic identities, which had become entrenched in the social structure of the 
South African society.  
Although there was no collapse of the war effort, endeavours to achieve national war 
cohesion and unity were undermined by the persistent inter-agency rivalries and turf wars. This was a 
result of the absence of clear foundations as well as the unplanned and unsystematic propaganda 
organisation. However, the value of having an efficient propaganda institution to influence public 
opinion and to promote state policies was realised. By mid-1944, the BOI was transformed from a 
wartime measure to a permanent state publicity institution beyond the war. A State Publicity Office 
was recommended.180 To “avoid disorganisation and overlapping and unnecessary expense”, a central 
control measure was also recommended.181 At the end of 1944, the government approved the State 
Publicity Office accountable to the Central Control Committee with executive powers, to “guide and 
direct the general policy of the organisation”.182 This illustrated that at the outbreak of the war, the 
government had given little thought to the publicity and propaganda system. Autonomous publicity 
and propaganda institutions acting ‘independently’ caused confusion and proved inefficient at lifting 
national morale. Attempts at improving the system, however, were too little too late. The National 
Party seized the opportunity of population apathy and low morale brought about by the war conditions 
to gain support and secure electoral victory at the expense of the ruling UP in 1948. 
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